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Administering that Ounce of Prevention:
New Drugs and Nuclear Reactors-IP1
DAvD

F.

CAvERs**

My first lecture demonstrated how hard it is to administer the
ounce of prevention in the case of new drugs, despite the fact
that approval proceedings in the Food and Drug Administrationthe FDA-are secret and unencumbered by legal formalities, affording much room for the exercise of discretion by the FDA's
scientific staff. Yet both the pharmaceutical industry and the
medical profession are chafing at the paperwork and delays and
complain that the fate of new drugs is at the mercy of the administrators. At the same time, some congressional and journalist
champions of the public are sharply critical of the FDA and suspect that, behind the screen of secrecy, the bureaucrats are being
soft on the drug industry.
Has the Atomic Energy Commission-the AEC-escaped this
cross-fire in administering the ounce of prevention for nuclear reactors? Here we shall see a process marked by resort to public hearings, even where no one has challenged the administrative decision. This, however, was not always the case; the AEC began
with a process almost as private as the FDA's is now. To understand the AEC's present problems, some background is essential.
Nuca.Am PoWER
The nuclear power industry is unique in the history of regulatory
law in that the regulatory law had to be enacted before the industry could be created. Man's mastery of nuclear fission as a
source of energy was acquired in secret and remained under the
cloak of the military until 1946. Then the McMahon Act created the
THE CONTROL PLAN FOR

OThis article is published in two parts. The first installment appeared
in the February issue of the West Virginia Law Review. 68 W. VA. L. REV.
109 (1966). The two articles are a slightly revised version of the Edward G.
Donley Memorial Lectures, delivered December 2 and 3, 1965, at the
College of Law, West Virginia University.
*OFessendenProfessor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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Commission assuring civilian control of the atom, albeit with some
military strings. The 1946 Act not only prescribed exclusive government ownership of fissionable materials but also left little room
for private enterprise in their use.' Yet, in the early Fifties, the
initiative of a pool of electric power, equipment and chemical
firms, with AEC encouragement and cooperation, led to the belief
that generating electric power from nuclear energy on an economic
basis was more than a remote possibility.
The United States Congress responded to this group's call to
emancipate the atom. It adopted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,2
an essentially new measure, as a framework for a nuclear industry.
The federal government still kept exclusive title to fissionable
material-the "special nuclear materials," U-235, U-233, plutonium,
and materials enriched in any of those substances-but it provided
for an elaborate scheme of licensing to enable industry to use
these materials while minimizing the dangers that lack of constant vigilance in their use might create.
Perhaps I should testify at this point concerning the magnitude
of these dangers and thereby prove the importance of prevention
in the regulation of nuclear power as I sought to do in my first
lecture with respect to new drugs. For nuclear reactors, the AEC
has done my work for me. In 1956, it commissioned a study of
the damage that might result from a runaway reactor, resolving
every uncertainty in the most pessimistic manner possible.3 The
resulting hypothetical accident levied an exceedingly improbable
toll but one that underlines the need for care. It killed 3,400
people, injured 43,000, and caused property damage of $7,000,000,000. The Congress recognized the improbability that injuries and
damages would rise to such heights, but, nonetheless, in 1957 the
Price-Anderson Amendments4 to the Atomic Energy Act required
'For the legislative history of McMahon Act 60 Stat. 755 (1946), 42
U.S.C. § § 1901-1819, and an analysis of its provisions, see N~wmiAN &
MILLER,

THE

CONTROL OF

AToMIc

ENERGY

(1948).

68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § § 2011-281 (1958), as amended
42 U.S.C. § § 2014-296 (hereinafter cited as AEA).
3 "Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large
Nuclear Power Plants" (commonly referred to as "The Brookhaven Report"),
1CCH ATonc ENERGY L. REP. f! 4031 (1957).
4 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § § 2014, 2210. For commentaries on the
act, see AEC study of the Price-Anderson Indemnity Act (Feb. 15, 1965)
in SsELcTED MATERIuS ON ATOMuc ENERGY INDEMNITY LEGISLATION, SuBCOmmrrE ON LEGISLATION, JOINT Coivnsaurr
ON AToMcC ENERGY, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. c.1 (1965); Cavers, Improving Financial Protection of the
Public Against the Hazards of Nuclear Power, 77 I-awv. L. REv. 644 (1964).
2
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every reactor operator to provide insurance which, in the case of
large reactors, must go to the maximum amount the insurance industry can write, a sum that has risen recently from $60,000,000 to

$74,000,000.' On top of this, Price-Anderson provided a governmental indemnity of half a billion dollars. Finally, the law has
cut off claims for injuries above that $560,000,000 total. Last fall
the Price-Anderson Act was renewed for ten years more without
significant change.6 Surely these facts relieve me from arguing the
importance of prevention for nuclear power reactors.

Confronted by hazards of this order, Congress prescribed strict
requirements for power and test reactors! A company wishing to
build a reactor had first to get a construction permit from the
AEC and then, when its reactor and power plants were complete,
to get an operating license. Moreover, the AEC was to determine
that the licensee had satisfied the statutory standards of promot-

ing "the common defense and security" and protecting "the health
and safety of the public."
The AEC interested certain industrial companies and electric
utilities in pioneering power reactors. It set up a division within

the Commission staff to pass on permit applications; it adopted

regulations8 governing its licensing process and created the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a fifteen-man part-time body
5 For the amendment to 10 C.F.R. § 140.11, increasing the insurance
required to be carried for reactors having a rated capacity of 100,000 kwe
or more to $74,000,000, see 30 Fed. Reg. 14779 (Nov. 29, 1965), 3 CCH
ATomlc
ENERGY L. PEL'. 20,800.
6
P.L. 89-210, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The principal change was
to provide in AEA § 171.c. & d., 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) & (d), for the reduction in the amount of the government indemnity as the amount of the private
insurance available increases. Thus the effect of the increase in the latter
from $60 to $74 million will be to reduce the indemnity to $486,000,000. In
reporting the bill, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (hereinafter termed
the JCAE") disclosed its intention to devote further study to such problems
as the basis of liability and the statute of limitations. See H.R. REP. No.
883, 789th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1965).
Financial protection is required not merely for reactors but for any
other "utilization or production facility" required to be licensed under § 103
or § 104. AEA § 170.a., 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a) (1958). The AEC has, for
example, brought within the category a spent fuel processing plant. See
In the Matter of Nuclear Fuel Serv., Inc. & New York State Atomic Research
& Dev. Authority, Docket No. 50-201, 2 CCH AToMc ENEaGY L. REP. If 11,
244 (1963). For a counterpart to the Brookhaven Report, supra note 3,
see Guthrie & Nichols
"Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major
Accidents in U 2 33 and Pu 2 3 9 Fuel Fabrication and Radioisotope Processing
Plants" (Oak Ridge Nat'l Lab. 1964).
8See AEC, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R.
c.1,
pt. 50, 3 CCH ATomc ENERGY L. REP. If 14,543.
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of distinguished experts to review license applications-a body embodying the "best man" principle of decision-making noted in my
first lecture. Though a public filing of the application was required, no public hearing was called for until the AEC had published a notice of its decision to issue a permit or a license. Thirty
days were then allowed for any "affected person" to request the
hearing for which the statute provided.
TBE CONTOL PLAN CmAuLENcED: TiB PRDC CASE
Plainly this plan would minimize resort to hearings. The application alone would give a protestant little chance to identify possible
grounds of objection to the permit.9 However, the plan was not
leak-proof. In 1956 the Power Reactor Development Corporationthe PRDC-applied for a construction permit for a fast-breeder
reactor to be built thirty miles from Detroit on the Lake Erie shore.
The fast-breeder concept was very advanced; only one experimental reactor of that type had been built. A breeder reactor has
the virtue of being able to produce more fissionable material than
it consumes. It would create more fissionable atoms of plutonium
in U-238, the relatively plentiful isotope of uranium, than it would
consume atoms of the relatively rare fissionable isotope, U-235."
PRDC was the off-spring of a group of major utilities and equipment makers. Its moving spirit was the Detroit Edison Company,
the prospective purchaser of the power. Unfortunately for the project, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards-the ACRSwas not wholly convinced of its safety. The ACRS communicated
its doubts to the AEC, but these were overridden. The atomic industry was then passing through one of its periodic spells of
euphoria, and to its more enthusiastic members the ACRS experts
doubtless seemed hypochondriacs. The construction permit was issued.
9 The evaluation of an application by the AEC staff and by the Advisory
Committee is a protracted proceeding, requiring expertise which even now
is possessed by relatively few and involving frequent contacts with the applicant's staff.
10 "In a reactor utilizing plutonium fuel . .. , one of the neutrons from
each plutonium fission would sustain the chain reaction and most of the
remainder (1.9 on the average) presumably could be captured by U-238
to produce new plutonium atoms. Charpie, The Geneva Conference in
AToMIC Pow~a 53, 56 (Scientific American ed. 1955). In the fast-breeder
reactor, the speed of the neutrons released by fission remains fast, not being
reduced by collision with a "moderator', e.g., graphite, used in the more usual
"thermal" reactors.
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Then, as I have intimated, came a leak. Just before the thirtyday period was to expire, the United Auto Workers, together with
certain other Detroit unions, having learned of ACRS's misgivings,
intervened in the proceeding, and demanded a hearing." The AEC
recognized the unions as "affected persons." Their members' lives,
homes and livelihoods would be jeopardized if the vast quantity
of highly radioactive material the reactor would accumulate were
released over the countryside and, depending on air currents, over
Detroit itself.
Thus began an epic battle. The intervenors saw as the Achilles'
heel in the Commission's case the fact that, when it acted, much
relevant information of importance to safety was still to be
supplied by the applicant. This is a problem that besets the
licensing of reactors. In a developing art, to require the detailed
design of a complex machine to be completed before its construction could begin would stretch out the interval between the venture's start and its completion. The company wanted to provide
enough information to sustain a provisional construction permit.
As the reactor's design and construction proceeded, it would fill in
the missing parts. When the time came to issue the operating
license, the Commission could then make the definitive findings
required of it.
The intervenors insisted that this sequence defeated the law's
purpose in requiring a construction permit. As they saw it, this
was to prevent the AEC from being faced by a fait accompli in
the form of a completed reactor into which millions of dollars had
been sunk, perhaps with staff encouragement and approval and
conceivably with AEC financial aid.
The upshot of the intervention was a protracted hearing before
an examiner, protracted deliberations in the Commission which

IIFor the series of administrative actions thereby initiated (together with
the subsequent judicial opinions), see 2 CCH AToicnc ENERGY L. RP. f1 11,
201. The
insisted
YCAE
on disclosure of the ACRS report on the PFDC
application to the AEC. Senator Clinton Anderson, then JCAE chairman,
refused to accept it on an "administratively confidential" basis, as AEC
Chairman Strauss requested. The AEC released the report three months later,
Chairman Strauss conceding that his effort to preserve secrecy was a "mistake."
For their correspondence, related statements and the ACRS report, see JCAE
ST.'F, 85th CONG., 1st SEss., A STUDy OF AEC PiocEDUaEs AND OnGANzATION IN THE LICENSING OF R.ACTOR FAcILmIS app. 6, 7, 8 (Jt. Comm.

Print 1957).
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stuck to its guns, 2 and an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia which by a two to one vote set aside the
Commission's order. 3 Then came review in the Supreme Court of
the United States. In June 1961, five and a half years after PRDC
applied to the Commission, the Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals and upheld the AEC's view that it could "defer a definitive safety finding until operation is actually licensed." The
Court held both statute and regulations were satisfied by the Commission's finding that there "was reasonable assurance in the record, for the purposes of this provisional construction permit, that
a utilization facility of the general type proposed .. .can be con-

structed and operated at the location proposed without undue risk
to the health and safety of the public."'"
Since the review did not stay construction, the reactor was
nearing completion when the Supreme Court spoke. Yet the fruits
of the legal victory are still to be enjoyed. The PRDC's creation,
the Enrico Fermi Reactor, experienced repeated technological setbacks. The pursuit of an operating license had to proceed by
gradual stages. A provisional license to operate at low power was
granted in May, 1963. Only last summer, more than four years
after the Supreme Court had cleared the way, the AEC was holding hearings prior to licensing fullpower operation. The AUW,
though still technically a contestant, had withdrawn from active
participation. The license was granted only after the date of these
lectures.' 6

12 For the AEC proceedings, see In the Matter of Power Reactor Dev. Co.,
1 AEC Rep. 1, 9, 10 (1956), 16, 18 (1957), 65 (1958), 128 (1959). The
intervenors offered no expert witnesses of their own, relying instead on crossexamination. Expert witnesses exchanged their testimony in writing in
advance of the hearing, a tactic calculated to further understanding, perhaps
consensus. It has become the regular practice in facility licensing proceedings,
and provision is made for it in AEC Rules of Practice, 10 C.F.R. § 2.743(b).
13

International Union of Elec. Workers v. United States, 280 F.2d 645

(D.C. Cir. 1960).
,4Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367
U.S. 396, 407 (1961).

,5Id. at 403.
16 A decision directing the issuance of an operating license was reached
by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Dec. 7, 1965 and became effective
forty-five days thereafter. 3 CCH ATOmIc ENEaG L. REP. 17, 225-92. The
withdrawal of the intervening unions occurred in hearings for the issuance
of a provisional (low-power) operating license after the Board had denied
their motion for a postponement following the report of a leak and a
sodium-water reaction in a PRDC steam generator. See id. at 17, 225-81.
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FRST REVISION OF THE LICENSING PROCESS

The PRDC may have produced the largest white elephant in
the history of American technology, 7 but it was the stimulus
to the first of a series of reexaminations of the AEC's reactor
licensing process.' 8 The Congress responded to the revelation that
the AEC had concealed scientific doubts as to the adequacy of its
safety findings by amending the Act. 9 The Commission was required, before reaching its decisions to give thirty days' notice and
to hold a hearing on every application for a construction permit or
license for a power or test reactor. Moreover, ACRS review of
each application for a permit or license was made mandatory and
the ACRS given statutory status. Its report was required to be
public "except to the extent that security classification"-long the
bugbear of nuclear-progress--"prevents disclosure." Secrecy was
to come virtually to an end. The application, including the preliminary hazards summary report, would be put on public file,
hopefully to be joined there by the staff's hazards analysis. Public
hearings were to be the rule, contest or no contest.
Here, one might suppose, was a scheme that should escape criticism. Both the applicant and the public were assured of open
hearings. Alas, the Congress's preventive medicine may have been
good, but the dosage soon proved excessive.
Chastened by criticism of its handling of PRDC, the AEC was
determined that its new procedure should be above legal reproach.
Once an application had been noticed for hearing, the Commission
separated the hazards evaluation staff from all contact with the
rest of the agency, and, when a licensing case reached it for decision, even the Commission itself refrained from consulting with
its own experts who had handled the application." Moreover, the
17 PRDC believes that, "the most useful... role of the Fermil reactor will
be to irradiate different types of fuel . . . to obtain information for future
fast reactors," rather than to generate electric power. Id. at 17, 225-03. How
far the reactor exceeded the cost of $44,020,000 projected in 1958, 1 AEC
Rep. 80, is not disclosed; plainly the factor of interest during construction and
test operation must have gone far beyond original estimates.
18Consultants to the JCAE staff in the first of these were two law professors,

J. F. Davison of George Washington University and J. G. Palfrey of Columbia
University, the latter now an AEC commissioner. See JCAE STAFF, op. cit.

supra note 11, at v.

1971 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § § 2039, 2232(b), 22 3 9(a) (1958),

amendingAEA
§ 29, 182.b., 189.a.
2 0
The "separated staff" (the Division of Licensing and Regulation, the
Division of Compliance, counsel for those divisions, and other portions of the
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AEC interpreted the hearing requirement to apply to every proposed amendment to the construction permit during the years that
elapsed between the initial hearing and the operating license stage.
The Commission also thrust on the ACRS the burden of passing on
each one of these amendments before hearing."
An AEC hearing was no informal business but the solemn reading of prepared texts to a hearing examiner, a lawyer whose task
it was to make up a record, complete with findings, to be sent
up to the Commission. Since the perfection of the reactor's design
during construction led to a long series of amendments, frustrating
delays were inevitable.22 Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, the
eminent authority on administrative law who was once a member
of the West Virginia law faculty, aptly criticized the procedure as
suffering from "dueprocessitis."2"
To make matters worse, the hearing process was essentially
meaningless.2 4 In the uncontested case, the real decision was made
before any hearing by the AEC's staff with the concurrence of the
ACRS. If an adverse view of a proposed design change were taken
by either body, the reactor applicant had no more incentive to
contest this in a hearing than a pharmaceutical house would have
reason to contest a finding of failure to provide the FDA's new
drug staff with enough data. The company could afford neither
the delay in construction nor the risk of adverse publicity that an
open contest would create. Ordinarily it would be cheaper to
design around the AEC's and the ACRS's objections if, that is, these
bodies could not be talked out of their positions in the privacy of
pre-hearing "negotiations."
AEC staff aiding in the staff's presentation at the hearing) was denied access
to the hearing examiner and to the Commission except on the public record.
See 1 JCAE STAF, 87th CONG., 1st SEss., IMPRovING THE AEC REGULATORY
PROCESS 18, 58 (Jt. Comm. Print 1961). The regulation embodying this rule,
10 C.F.R. § 2.734, as late as 1962, excepted "initial licensing," admittedly
an error derived from the same exception in § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Cavers, Administrative Decisionmaking in Nuclear Facilities
Licensing, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 330, 341 n.44 (1963).
21 This resulted from a literal interpretation of the 1957 amendment,
combined with the difficulty of making the selection of questions for ACRS
consideration.
See 1 JCAE STAFF SrtmY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 3, 49, 52.
22
For summarized chronologies of improtant permit and license applications, see 1 id. pt. III; for the chronologies themselves, see 2 id. 173-304.
23 See Davis, Dueprocessitisin the Atomic Energy Commission, 47 A.B.A.J.
782 (1961).
24 See Cavers, supra note 20, at 342-48; 1 JCAE STAFF STUDY, op. cit.
supra note 20, at 50-52. For a detailed description and critique of the licensing
process at the hearing stage, see BFRmAN & HYDEM", THE ATOwc ENERGY
COMM ssIoN AND REGuLATING NucLEAn FAciLrriEs (1961), reprinted in part
in 2 JCAE STAFF SrUDY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 477-89.
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OF "NE:GoTiATONS" iN Tm LICENSING PROCESS

I am repeating a term that in my first lecture I borrowed from
a scientist who used it to describe informal discussions between
drug approval applicants and the FDA staff, but it also has been
used to describe pre-hearing exchanges concerning construction
permits." It may have a sinister sound. It is important enough
to deserve analysis. How do a bureaucrat and an industry applicant negotiate? What does each have to offer to the other?
The official, though low in the agency's hierarchy, has the power
to hold up the approval or the permit. His view may not ultimately
prevail but, by sticking to it, he can at the least protract the proceedings. His position may go only to the need for more data or
to involve some change in label claims or warnings or an alteration
in the design of some reactor component. The applicant wants him
to drop the point or to accept modifications that would render it
less objectionable-or less expensive. What can the applicant do
to move the bureaucrat?
Perhaps the applicant's most important lever is a shared purpose: presumably in most cases both parties will want to see
the application go through, the drug made available to those who
need it, the reactor put into operation. Hence, the applicant's
experts and counsel may seek subtly to make the staff experts
feel like obstructionists, magnifying difficulties that more practical
men consider well within a reasonable zone of tolerance. The official who yields to such an argument (which, of course, may be
thoroughly sound) can see himself as a broad-gauged, forwardlooking man, distinct from the stuffy bureaucratic stereotype. On
the other hand, if he holds his ground, the industry negotiators can
regretfully intimate that they will have to go higher up, perhaps,
if the case is serious, beyond the walls of the agency itself. No
doubt the most potent threat would be to withdraw the application
altogether and thus place on the official the onus of having stultified progress in science or technology.
The staff man's position would be easier if he could always be
sure of his ground, but almost always, of course, the matter at
issue is one of degree, of judgment, and rational doubt will be
25 1 have seen the term used in this context in print, but, alas, the
reference now eludes me. None of the highly knowledgeable persons who
have read my manuscript have taken exception to my use of the term; indeed,
one gave me some elaboration of the negotiating process.
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hard to suppress. Moreover, the choice will rarely be between
intransigence and surrender. The label claim can be modified,
but not as much as was first insisted on; the extra reactor study
can be undertaken but on a smaller scale; the design altered but
less importantly. Compromises like these are inevitable, and
probably are very often in the public interest. Unfortunately, if
the staff is weak or its morale low, the staff may yield more than
the public interest would allow. This risk26 is one of the main
reasons why a need may be felt for an open review of administrative decision-making before the process is completed.
An effective review procedure in an uncontested case is not
easily contrived. Suppose, as has almost always been true, the
applicant for a construction permit and AEC's hazards evaluation staff are in agreement. The lawyer who sits as hearing
examiner will listen to the harmonious testimony of applicant and
staff witnesses. What chance is there then that he will penetrate
the obscurities of the highly technical evidence and lay bare defects
in the reactor's design? The few times in permit hearings that the
examiner questioned scientific findings or asked for more evidence,
his initiative was greeted with dismay. When, in due course, the
examiner produces a set of findings, these are passed on to the
Cormnission for informal review. Though scientists have usually
been included among its members, they can scarcely be expected
to probe the record of every hearing and to take issue now and
then with its staffs conclusions. In actuality, the principal burden
of review at the Commission level appears at one time to have
fallen on the lawyer assigned to aid the Commissioners in these
matters."
THE E MRGENCE OF

=rm

AToNac SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARDS

By 1962, dissatisfaction with this licensing procedure reached
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy-the JCAE-which keeps
watch over the AEC's administration for the Congress. It directed
its staff to study the problem anew. William Mitchell, former AEC
26 It is mitigated in AEC reactor licensing by the participation of the
ACRS, a subcommittee of which will keep in close touch with the AEC
staff as the review progresses. Both staff and subcommittee may therefore be
involved in separate negotiating processes. Since they frequently meet with
the applicant's staff together, a tendency to concession by one may be offset
by inflexibility on the part of the other. In this process, the subcommittee is
reinforced by the fact that its positions will be reviewed by the entire ACRS.
27 See Cavers, supra note 20, at 347.
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general counsel, and I served as consultants to the staff. The study's
recommendations" were at variance with those of the AEC's own
staff.29 The latter contemplated little change. The study also rejected the more radical proposal advanced in a University of
Michigan Law School study, calling for fission in the Commission
itself, proposing a permanent new agency to make regulatory decisions unencumbered by the AEC's a promotional obligations to
the budding nuclear power industry.3"
Looking at the AEC's licensing machinery from the vantage
point of the JCAE, we felt that both its hazards evaluation
staff and the ACRS had been doing good work and that they could
do even better work if the staff did not have to hold hearings on
every proposed amendment to a construction permit and if the
ACRS could operate on a more selective basis. Relief from these
burdens could be achieved rather simply by statutory change. The
really difficult problems in the regulatory process emerged only
as one looked ahead to the time when the volume of license applications had multiplied and when the busy members of the
ACRS could no longer scrutinize every new reactor. Perhaps by
then, too, the best of the AEC's hazards exaluation staff would
have been wooed away by private employers. What further safeguard, if any, was needed against these contingencies?
Separation of the Commission into two bodies did not seem
called for by the pressure of business then foreseeable. Moreover,
some feared that a body whose only duty was to assure safety might
grow so biased as to be unreasonably demanding. They saw the
fact that the AEC's promotional duties clashed on occasion with
its regulatory mission as a virtue, making for balance in its judgments. The hearing seemed to be the final line of defense, yet
the lawyer-examiner could hardly be relied on to man that bastion
all alone.
Groping for a solution, the JCAE staff came up with a proposal to create an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board comprised
of a hearing examiner or other lawyer and two "technically quali28 See 1 JCAE STAFF STUDY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 66-75.
29 See AEC, Report on the Regulatory Program of the Atomic Energy
Commission in 2 JCAE STAFF STUmY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 399-400, 413-20.
30 See Br. r & HYDmwA, op. cit. supra note 24, at 319-36, reprinted in
2 JCAE STAFF STuDY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 545-57.
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The presence of the latter

would give assurance that the hearing would not be pro forma,
that the case made by the applicant and by the AEC could be
subjected to critical scrutiny. Legal and scientific techniques of
inquiry and evaluation were to work in harness. The JCAE staff
even proposed that decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board, as the new body was called, should not be subject to
Commission review. 2 This the Congress rejected in adopting
the board idea." Moreover, Congress authorized the Commission
to establish ad hoc boards to be drawn from a panel to be appointed by it,'4 and this is the plan the AEC has actually followed.' Congress also relieved the AEC and ACRS of their mandatory jurisdiction over an applicant's amendments and left the holding of public hearings at the operating license stage to the AEC's
discretion. 6 Finally, in reporting the amendments, the JCAE encouraged informality in licensing hearings "to the maximum
extent permitted by the Administrative Procedure Act."' 7
Professor Davis, I should report, did not view these proposals
with favor. Absent a contest, he saw no reason for a hearing
whatever; he proposed instead that a public proceeding in the
nature of a press conference be held in the vicinage of a proposed
31 See 1 JCAE STFF STUDY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 69-75. The proposal
did not specify a lawyer, merely "a person knowledgeable in the conduct of
administrative proceedings." Id. at 69. Though obviously this criterion which
the Congress adopted (substituting "qualified" for "knowledgeable"), points
to members of the legal profession, the JCAE report on the bill expressly noted
that non-lawyers might be used. See SEN. REP. No. 1677, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1962).
" See 1 JCAE STAFF STUDy, op. cit. supra note 20, at 70. The Commission would retain rule-making authority. Ibid.
3"The 1962 amendments provided inter alia, for the creation by the
Commission of "one or more atomic saiety and licensing boards," composed
as had been proposed, "to conduct such hearings as the Commission may
direct and make such intermediate or final decisions as the Commission may
authorize with respect to the granting, suspending, revoking or amending of
any license ....
'
AEA § 191.a., 76 Stat. 409, 42 U.S.C. § 2241(a).

'3

Tbid.

,"The Commission has recently enlarged the panel to eighteen members
and proposes to adopt a suggestion, recently advanced in the report of a
Review Panel infra note 58, that an alternate technical member be appointed
to each board. See AEC, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amendment to
10 C.F.R. § 2.721(b), 31 Fed. Reg. 832, 833 (Jan. 21, 1966).
36 For the amendment affecting ACRS review, see AEA § 182.b., as
amended, 76 Stat. 409, 42 U.S.C. § 2232(b); for the amendments relating to
hearings, see AEA § 189.a., as amended, 76 Stat. 409, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a).
".SeeSEN. lE'. No. 1677, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1962). In a proposed
AEC Statement of General Policy, informality in uncontested hearings is
invited. See AEC, Notice of Proposed Rule Makg, app. A, § 111(6), supra
note 35, at 835.
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reactor. There AEC officials could defend their decision and answer the questions of interested citizens. 8 This position, which
bespoke great confidence in the long-term adequacy of unchecked
AEC staff decisions,"' has since been adopted in one respect:
hearings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards are now
held near to the proposed reactor sites.
Once more a new procedure seemed to have solved AEC's
problem of how best .to administer its ounce of prevention. The
applicant still could work out its problems informally with the
hazards evaluation staff and the expert members of the ACRS,
getting the kind of high-level evaluation that the drug industry
has been pining for. To be sure, unfavorable judgments by these
two official bodies could not readily be opposed. Yet, if the
issue were not dramatic enough to arouse public opposition to this
public-relations-conscious industry, an applicant might try to persuade a Board that both staff and ACRS had erred.
As a means of assuring the public that a disinterested and competent body has not only scrutinized the AEC's staff work but is
ready to listen to informal objections from persons lacking the preparation, standing or funds needed to intervene, ° the Boards represent a marked improvement over hearing examiners. And whenever the intervention of an "affected person" gives rise to a contested proceeding, a Board's relative independence should increase public confidence in its decision.
NEw ThOUBLES AmsE: THE Srr=nG PEOBLEM

Unfortunately, the AEC's actual experience is again disappointing these satisfactions. A series of difficult cases has arisen. However, not all the difficulties can be laid at the door of the licensing
"'See JCAE STAFF, 87TrH CONG., 1st SESS., Vmws AND CoMadNrs ON
IMPnOVING THE AEC REGuLATORY PNocEss 25 (Jt. Comm. Print 1961).

For

an exchange of views on the relative merits of Professor Davis' plan and the
JCAE staff proposals, see Cavers, supra note 20; Davis, Nuclear Facilities
Licensing: Another View, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 371 (1962); Cavers, Nuclear
Licensing Facilities: A Word More, id. at 389.
39 Of course, as long as the ACRS can continue an active surveillance of
staff decisions, the latter do not go "unchecked." However, the assumption
underlying proposals for procedural change has been that the ACRS would
before long f'nd it impossible to continue its case-by-case review.

40 In addition to poviding for the intervention of persons ,adversely
affected, the AEC's Rs
of Practice permit "limited appearances,' on due
notice to the parties, by persons lacking standing or not wishing to assert their
adverse interests formally. Such an appearance is limited to the making of
"oral or written statements on the issues involved in the proceeding." See
10 C.F.R. § 2.731. The statements may, of course, raise questions.
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process. Some grow out of siting problems where the issue is

less the intrinsic safety of the reactor and more the suitability of its
proposed location. Though scientific and technological data and
opinions are essential to gauging the dimensions of a site's risk,
the question whether a given risk is worth taking is one which
deeply engages community values. The three cases which I shall
report briefly below are atypical, but they cast a shadow into
the future.
The first case, one that promised to provide a dramatic example
of citizenry rising to oppose a nuclear reactor, began with the filing
late in 1962 of an application by the Consolidated Edison Company of New York to construct a million kilowatt nuclear power
plant in Ravenswood, across the East River from mid-Manhattan."
Not only was this the largest reactor ever proposed but the sites
of other power reactors were all remote from populous communities. Distance affords a protection that the AEC has viewed as
even more reliable than multiple engineered safeguards. Distance, however, adds to cost, and Consolidated Edison contended
that it could design a reactor which, as H. C. Forbes, Chairman
of the Board, put it, would be "absolutely safe."4"
New York's reception to this proposal was preponderantly hostile. A motion was made in the City Council to exclude any reactor within the city limits, research reactors excepted."3 Public concern began to build up. The AEC declared the subject of reactorsafety pre-empted by the federal government and denied New
York City jurisdiction to bar an approved reactor.44 The crisis
was reaching a peak when Consolidated Edison abandoned its
plan, asserting a sudden preference for bringing hydroelectric
power from Labrador. Though this rendered the issue of jurisdiction moot, I cannot resist repeating a position I have previously
41See Nuclear Plant in New York City?, 9 Forum Memo, Dec. 1962, p. 11.
Various facets of the problem posed by the Consolidated Edison proposal were
surveyed for the Citizens' Committee on Radiation Information (a New York

group)
in Herber, The Ravenswood Reactor (undated).
42
N. Y. Times, May 21, 1963.
4'New York City Council Majority Leader Treulich introduced a bill that
would bar all reactors within the city limits, later amended to except research
reactors. After a tumultuous hearing, Treulich indicated his intention to press
his bill and predicted its passage. For reports of these developments, see
10 Forum
Memo, May 1963, p. 10, July 1963, p. 8, and Aug. 1963, p. 28.
44

Robert Lowenstein director of AEC's Division of Licensing and Regulation, appeared at the hearing to assert exclusive federal authority. This
position also was declared by AEC Chairman Seaborg in a letter to the
president of the New York City Council. See 10 Forum Memo, July 1963, p. 9.
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asserted.45 I believe the act pre-empts for the United States the
power to determine a reactor's safety, but I do not see in that
pre-emption any barrier to a city's deciding that, to protect the
amenities of life, it wishes no such mechanism within its bounds,
however safe it may be and however unreal may be the forebodings
of its anxious citizenry. If Congress wants to take away that privilege, it should pay the political price of doing so explicitly.46
The next instance of active public opposition came when the
Pacific Gas & Electric Company proposed to build a reactor of
medium size at Bodega Head, a picturesque spot on the California
coast north of San Francisco.4" At first the opponents were conservationists who would have opposed a fossil-fuel power plant
in that location with equal fervor. However, when their opposition
on this score seemed unlikely to prevail, they turned to the site.
This lay within a quarter mile of the great San Andreas fault, the
line along which California earthquakes are most likely to occur.
The views of geologists, especially seismologists, were sought.
Did the fault lines extend into the site itself, was there a genuine
risk of a shearing or shifting of rock so severe as to destroy the
carefully engineered containment? The problem never reached an
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. The AEC staff reported adversely on the site though the ACRS had given its approval. Confronted by this division and a hostile public as well, the company
withdrew its application.4"
Today still another siting controversy is in process. The municipal power authority of Los Angeles, the Department of Water
and Power (LADWP), wishes to build a large power reactor to
add to its electric capacity without adding to the smog. The site
is near a fault line, and intervenors allege an earthquake hazard.
An Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is now trying not merely to
4' See Cavers, Legislative Readjustments in Federal and State Regulatory
Powers over Atomic Energy, 46 CALrF. L. Rzv. 22, 36 (1958); Cavers, State
Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic Reactors, 50 Ky. L. J. 29, 50
(19 46
1Advocates of exclusive federal authority point to the possibility that
restrictive state and municipal laws would cripple the development of nuclear
power. If this fear ever began to be realized, doubtless the Congress would
assert federal power - unless the Congress had come to share state and local
anxieties.
4 For an account of this controversy by one of the opponents, see
Hedgpeth, Bodega Head-A Partisan View, 21 Bull. Atomic Scientists No. 3,

P. 1 (1965).

48 See the Bodega Bay Debacle: Demolished by Hypothesis, 11 Nuclear
Industry, Nov. 1964, p. 3.
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assess the intrinsic safety of the reactor design but also to decide
whether even a well-designed reactor at that location would create
"an undue risk to the public health and safety," to quote the relevant standard in the AEC regulation.49
The site over which the controversy rages is Corral Canyon in
the famous Malibu Beach area a little west of Los Angeles. Residents of the area, who include a number of the movie colony,
have formed a citizens' group to intervene. An individual intervenor is an estate owner who would lose 200 of his acres to the
project. His name is Hope, Bob Hope. A third intervenor is a
land company whose acreage would either be taken or suffer a loss
in value. In challenging the safety of a reactor built close to a
fault line, the intervenors note the exposure of bathers who throng
nearby beaches on weekends. They point to the many users of the
coastal highway between the reactor site and the sea. The Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors voted unanimously to intervene after having reversed the county planning commission's
grant of a zoning exception to the LADWP°
The Board has met for hearings four times since March, 1965.
Its concern led the Department to dig a great trench to expose
possible fault lines in the rock beneath the site, but the resulting
revelations are ambiguous. Seismologists who had testified for the
intervenors before the digging remain uneasy. Senator Murphy
has suggested the AEC reconsider. The AEC staff position remains
unchanged though "subject to modification." Now proposed findings and briefs are scheduled for late April. Rather wistfully the
Board asks that the briefs aid it in defining "undue risk."5'
EVALUATING INcoMiPLTE

BEAcroR

DESIGNS FOR SAFETY

These three cases present sensational challenges to the reactor
builder's art, but safety problems may be no less real though far
less conspicuous. As reactors multiply, economic pressure to build
them ever closer to centers of population will surely grow. So too
49 See 10 C.F.R. § 50.35. To issue a provisional construction permit
before all the technical information can be supplied, the Commission must be
"satisfied that it has information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance
that a facility of the general type proposed can Te constructed and operated
at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the
public and that the omitted information will be supplied ....
50 The interventions are reported in 12 Nuclear Industry Mar. 1965, p. 11.
The zoning issue has been deferred until the permit issue bas been resolved.
LADWP does not regard itself as bound to obtain the exception. See id. at 12.
"' For the Board's request, see 11 Nuclear Industry, Oct. 1965, p. 9; for
other recent developments in the proceeding, see id., Nov. 1965, p. 20.
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will economic pressure to reduce the capital costs imposed by redundant safety devices and elaborately engineered systems of containment. Today it is urged that the safeguard of distance can be
replaced by engineered safeguards; in time, some of these will
be attacked as anachronistic relics of the primitive period of nuclear
power. How well does AEC's present procedure seem to meet the
needs of the trying period of transition that I foresee? Two cases
point up a difficulty, one that first manifested itself in the PRDC
case.
This difficulty springs from the need to avoid costly delays by
issuing a provisional construction permit while the reactor design
is far from complete. Two Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards
have faced the perplexing problem of evaluating the safety of an
incompletely designed reactor, and they have responded in different ways. In December, 1964, a Board reviewed the application
of the Jersey Central Light & Power Co. to build and operate a
very large boiling-water reactor on the northern New Jersey coast.
The Board was willing to grant a provisional construction permit
but only on condition that it retain jurisdiction and, within 180
days, receive more data on a rather formidable array of design
features as to which "critically important (as regarding safety)
design details" were still to be provided. The Board also set a
sixty-day time limit on submission for in camera review of the
contract provisions between Jersey Central and General Electric,
its turnkey contractor, relating to "their respective safety and design
responsibilities.""
This position enabled the Board members to square their professional consciences with granting a provisional permit before they
were satisfied that the reactor's design gave "reasonable assurance
that" unresolved "safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved"
by the completion date set for the facility. Their order created a
conditionl provisional permit, and, I need scarcely add, neither the
AEC staff nor the applicant and its contractor liked the solution.
They appealed to the Commission, contending that the features of
the reactor's design for which the Board sought additional information were features which had not previously required specific approval until the operating license stage, and that further hearings
52 For the series of decisions and orders in Jersey Central Power & Light
ENERGY L. REP. ff 11, 249. For the order in

Co. Reactor, see 2 CCH ATol¢nc

the Board's initial decision, see id. at 17, 485.
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were not needed unless, at the latter stage, when all the design
options had been taken and the reactor built, a final hearing
seemed desirable.
While this case was pending before the Commission, the same
problem confronted another Board convened to pass on the application of the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation to build near
Oswego, New York, a boiling-water reactor of about the same
size as Jersey Centrars. Before this Board had acted, the Commission ruled that the Jersey Central Board had authority to extend its own life beyond its initial decision, though the Commission reserved the question whether the Board's conditions represented an abuse of discretion.5 3
In a thoughtful opinion devoted as much to its procedural
predicament as to its findings of fact and conclusions, the Niagara
Mohawk Board decided to order the granting of the provisional
permit "with no special conditions requiring further . . . review
by this Board." However, after noting that "all questions relating
to operating safety, except for the suitability of the site . . . , remain for later administrative evaluation," the Board expressed "uneasiness over whether the proper purposes of a statutory hearing
are adequately served by the . . . plan which leaves for future
administrative action the making of judgments upon important
safety questions which probably will not have been reviewed in
a public forum.""
NEw RECOMMENDATIONS:

THE STAFF ANALYSIS

RISES AND THE HEAING DECLINES

A month later the Commission absolved the Jersey Central
Board of having abused its discretion" but noted that the staff,
aided by a panel, had embarked upon still another procedural
study.56 The seven-man Regulatory Review Panel, comprised of
industry and university experts chaired by Mr. Mitchell, reported in mid-July. 7 The Panel recommended that respon11 See id at 17, 485-3 (Feb. 18, 1965).
- 4 Niagara-Mohawk Power Corp. Reactor, id. If11, 250, at 17, 487-15.
'-' See id. at 17, 485-5 (May 6, 1965). The Commission observed,
"Whether we would ourselves have required every item of information requested is not in question." Id. at 17, 485-6.
S56 See id. at 17, 485-5. For the appointment of the Panel by AEC Chairman Seaborg, see AEC News Release 11-17, Jan. 25, 1965.
5 The Panel submitted its report, a
sixty-eight page typed document, on
July 14, 1965. AEC News Release H-165, July 21, 1965.
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sibility for reactor safety continue to be reposed in the AEG's
regulatory staff, the ACRS, and the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Boards. However, it was emphatic in declaring that the staffs
responsibility should be primary. The prospect that the ACRS
would be overburdened by mounting applications led the Panel to
urge that the ACRS be relieved of routine reviews and devote
itself to novel safety problems and basic questions. Voicing concern at the layering of safety reviews, the Panel would have the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in any uncontested case hold
a single hearing to determine "whether or not the .

.

. Staff has

made a thorough and complete safety analysis supporting its conThe Board's duty should be simply to "test and
clusions
demonstrate for the record the adequacy of the staff review." 9 If
it found gaps in the record, it might insist that they be filled, but,
if it should be convinced that an adequate review had led the
staff to a conclusion on safety that was dead wrong, the Board's
duty would still be to approve the proposed granting of the permitand to do so promptly.6" In other words, the Board's role would be
rather like an appellate court's. The court searches the record below for errors of law or procedure but declines to substitute its own
judgment on questions of fact for that of the jury or the trial judge.
It may be asking too much of the scientific mind to expect
it thus to approve what it considers error, even though that error
is the fruit of careful study. It may seem that the Boards are
being asked to "play charades" for the benefit of the public, as
one knowledgeable skeptic suggested to me. The Panel flatly declared that, "the public hearing is not a proper instrument for the
solution of complex technical problems bearing on reactor safety.""
Yet whenever an intervenor seizes the opportunity afforded by the
notice of hearing to attack the staff's proposal, the case becomes
contested. Thereupon, for good or ill, the public hearing has
to be the instrument for solving "complex technical problems bearing on reactor safety."
5

8 Regulatory Review Panel Report 38.
1Id. at 37. The Panel adds, "it would not be the hearing board's function 6to0 conduct de novo, its own independent safety review"
Probably a Board so dissatisfied would find some basis for challenging
the sufficienc of the information or the adequacy of the staff's review; at the
least, it could cast such doubt on the staff's conclusions as to assure careful
review by the Commission itself.
61 Regulatory Review Panel Report 37.
59
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The Commission has recently proposed to accept the Panel's
recommendations for the procedure to be followed in uncontested
cases. In proposed amendments to its Rules of Practice, published
on January 20, 1966, it would have the Board, "without conducting
a de novo review of the application, determine whether the application and the record of the proceeding contain sufficient information, and the review of the application by the Commission's
regulatory staff has been adequate, to support" the findings which
would be required to sustain the issuance of a construction permit
in a contested case.62

A proceeding conducted with these objectives would seem to
me to satisfy the statutory requirement of a hearing. The findings
as to the sufficiency of information and the adequacy of the
safety review would ordinarily sustain the inference-and so the
substantive conclusion-that the "proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue
risk to the health and safety of the public." If, however, this attenuated hearing had been diluted still further as had been urged
in some quarters, if the Board-or a hearing examiner-had only to
accept for the record a recital of the information at hand and
a report of the staffs operations without passing on the adequacy of
either, then the proceeding would have been reduced to an essentially ceremonial status. Such a "hearing" would have complied
less with the statute than with Professor Davis' proposal that the
AEC simply hold a press conference near the reactor site in uncontested cases. 3
Of course, the Atomic Energy Act could be amended to do
away with any hearing in the absence of a contest, thereby com62
AEC, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amendment to 10 C.F.R.
§ 2.104(b)(2), supra note 35, at 833. To the amended Rules of Practice
there is proposed to be added, as Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, a proposed
"Statement of General Policy: Conduct of Proceedings for the Issuance of
Construction Permits for Production and Utilization Facilities for which a
Hearing is Required .... . .. Id. at 833. The Statement spells out the
requirements of the Rules of Practice and adds certain matters drawn from
the Panel's recommendations which "do not require or lend themselves, to
inclusion as formal rules .... Id. at 832.
63 The statutory requirement of a hearing was continued when the act
was amended in 1962 with full knowledge that most AEC permit proceedings
were uncontested. Absence of a contest does not of itself remove the need
for compliance with a hearing requirement, as our divorce courts daily bear
witness. Even in the uncontested divorce case, the judge must decide that
statutory criteria have been satisfied. Lack of a contest does alter the purpose
of the hearing from the more usual one of resolving a dispute to that of
public scrutiny of official action. See Cavers, supra note 20, at 359.
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pleting the cycle by restoring internal decision-making as the
accepted practice and reducing public decision-making to the position it had held before the PRDC case-except for the publication
of the ACRS report, if any, and the applicanfs and the staffs
"safety analyses." 4 In that event, whenever a more searching check
could not be assured by a well financed and sophisticated intervenor, the exposed communities-and the whole power reactor industry whose very life depends on avoiding any atomic disaster anywhere-would have to rely on the effectiveness of the staffs review. If the Panel's recommendations were to be accepted by the
AEC and the Congress, this review would seldom be reinforced
by the second layer of review that the ACRS now provides, although, hopefully, the ACRS would be called on to review the
"more difficult and novel reactor safety problems."
Perhaps this is enough. The staff may well continue to merit
the praise that the Panel bestows upon it, even after an increased
volume of reactor construction has begun to lure its experts back
to industry. The design criteria that the AEC is now publishing
for comment, as elaborated and supplemented over time, may
provide important safeguards.6" Moreover, as the Niagara Mohawk Board's opinion makes plain,66 the present scheme assures
a public review of no more than the incomplete design and so
leaves virtually all the safety questions without final answers. The
tactic which the Board in the Jersey Central case employed to
meet this problem-the issuance of a provisional permit conditioned
on the receipt of further satisfactory evidence of safety as the
design progressed-appears to have been negatived by the Commission's proposed amendments.6" A Board which is dissatisfied
64

Among the proposed amendments to regulations for the licensing of
reactors (and authorizing of Commission reactors not subject to licensing)
are changes in nomenclature which the Commission proposes as "more accurate." AEC, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Facility Licensing Procedure,
supra note 35, at 832. The amendments to parts 50 and 115 would substitute
"safety analysis report" and "safety analysis" for "hazards summary report"
and "hazards
analysis." Id. at 837. The public relations gain is obvious.
6
- General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits, AEC Press Release H-252 (Nov. 22, 1965). The twenty-seven criteria
are very general, as is evidenced by the fact that they absorb less than nine
pages of double-space typescript.
66 See text at note 54, supra.
67The Commission's action has taken the form of a proposed amendment
to its Rules of Practice, 10 C.F.R. § 2.717(a), providing that the jurisdiction
of the presiding officer (and hence of a Board) terminates upon the expiration of the period within which a record may be certified to the Commission
for final decision or when the Commission reaches a final decision. See AEC,
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with the information presented to it can, of course, request more
and recess the hearing until it is provided. However, this delays
the construction permit's issuance and so prevents virtually all
work on the reactor, a consequence the Jersey Central Board was
seeking to avoid.
Probably it is unrealistic to hope to meet the problem posed
by the gradual evolution of a reactor's design by means of a
system of public review which has to depend on ad hoc boards.
The experts who staff them are subject to many competing demands and could seldom expect to maintain surveillance during
the months-and sometimes the years-in which answers were being reached for the safety questions that the first public hearing
had to leave open. If it should be decided that public scrutiny of
internal decision-making in reactor licensing is in the public interest, then the only realistic means of achieving this may be the
creation of a full-time Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, perhaps reinforced on occasion by co-opted experts, aided by a staff
of its own, and having authority to review proposed permit and
license actions by public hearing when these are contested or
whenever it judges that the importance of the safety issues in an
uncontested case warrants its interposition. In 1962, doubtless this
solution seemed premature;68 today I believe it merits renewed
consideration, not for this year or the next, but for a not distant
future.
This hesitant look into the future which I ventured in my
lecture has been followed by another look in more specific terms
and from a high official source-in a speech entitled "Looking
Ahead at the AEC Regulatory Program" by AEC Commissioner
James T. Ramey on January 20, 1966. After reviewing the AEC's
past reactor licensing procedures and its proposed amendments
to its Rules of Practice, Commissioner Ramey said:
I believe it would be useful to establish a permanent chairNotice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 35, at 831. The issuance of a
conditional provisional permit would appear to call for a final decision which
would terminate the Board's jurisdiction before the condition could be
complied with.
68 The JCAE staff proposed a full-time board within the framework of
the AEC and rejected proposals for a full-time independent board, e.g., in
BEa
N & HYD AN, op. cit. supra note 24, arguing in part that its proposal
would "provide a foundation for the creation of an independent agency when

large-scale development of atomic power makes such a move desirable."
JCAE STAFF REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 20, at 67.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol68/iss3/2

1

22

Cavers: Administering That Ounce of Prevention: New Drugs and Nuclear Rea
1966]

NEW DRUGS AND NUCLEAR REACTORS-I

255

man for the licensing boards, and perhaps set up a small
permanent staff. Such a chairman could help bring greater
consistency to the board system, and he could act as liaison
between the Commission and the other board members ....
In the next five to ten years, as we gain experience and
confidence, and the volume of applications increases, I would
expect that the mandatory hearing process might be eliminated,
and the licensing board system might evolve into a more permanent full time board with the Commission delegating to it
final adjudicatory authority, subject to the rule making power
of the Commission. Finally sometime thereafter as further experience is gained, it might be desirable to establish the Commission's regulatory organization as a wholly separate agency,
possibly combining with it some of the functions of the Federal
Radiation Council and the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare.69
LEssONS FOR THE

FDA FRoM AEC EXPERIENCE

Though the AEC has not solved its problems of procedure, does
its experience in grappling with them have lessons for the FDA?
Obviously the tasks set the two agencies differ: power and test
reactors are huge, multi-million-dollar affairs, and there are relatively few of them; new drugs, though less costly to discover and
develop, are, of course, far more numerous. People are much aware
of the risk from a big reactor to the windward than of a drug that
may be dangerous or ineffective. No one really expects to be
taking that drug. Yet I suspect you have observed that both
agencies' approval processes pose certain basic questions: whether
applications should be open or confidential, whether decision-making should be internal or public, which roles in the process should
be played by experts and which by administrators, and whether
an opportunity to be heard should be given to "affected persons'
other than the applicant. Some comparisons may have suggestive
value.
69

AEC News Release No. IN-661, Jan. 28, 1966, pp. 17-18. The speech
was delivered at a Nuclear Power Briefing for Utility Executives held in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee. Commissioner Ramey was Executive Director of the

JCAE staff at the time of the 1961 JCAE staff study, supra note 20. The
AEC's continuing concern with its regulatory procedures has led to the appointment of still another review panel, also under the chairmanship of William

Mitchell. It is charged with the study of procedures in contested licensing
cases. See AEC Press Release J-86 (April 4, 1966).
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The Secrecy of Applications. Is the FDA unwise to keep its
new drug applications-its NDAs-secret in contrast to the AEC's
practice of public filing of applications and of safety analyses by
both staff and applicant? To be sure, the FDA is not free under

the lMw to disclose "trade secrets" or to disregard professional in-

hibitions, 0 but even NDAs that had been carefully edited for public
filing would reveal much more of the bases of FDA decisions than
is now accessible. Closely related to this question of secrecy is the
question whether, if the secrecy were to be relaxed and edited
NDAs of approved drugs made public, makers of like drugs should
be required to duplicate in all respects the investigations and applications required of the pioneer.
FDA's philosophy appears to be that the drug manufacturer
should have to make only such disclosure to the FDA of its
formulas, research experience and processes as is needed to enable
the agency to pass on its product; disclosure to the public can
be limited to the information required for the protection of drug
users, such as warnings of side effects and contra-indications on
labels and in labeling."' Among those opposing compulsory dis-

70

Food Drug & Cosmetic Act § 301(j), 21 U.S.C. § 331(k)
prohibits
revealing any information acquired under authority of specified sections
,concerning any ethod or process which as a trade secret is entitled to
protection." An effort in 1962 to broaden this provision by striking the
quoted clause wvas defeated in conference. Conference Report to accompany
S. 1552, H.R. Rep. No. 2526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1962). For its applcation to "new drugs," see 21 C.F.R. § 130.32 (1965). Disclosure by a federal
official "not authorized by law" of information acquired from investigations
or reports which "concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations,
sYl or work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential' statistical data, . ..
o any person, . . . [or] corporation, . . ." is a federal crime. 62 Stat. 791
(1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1905. Regulations and orders issued under the investigational drug and report-keeping amendments "shall have due regard for the
professional ethics of the medical profession and the interests of patients."
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act § 505(i),(j), 21 U.S.C. § 505(i),(j) (Supp.
1964). This provision also authorizes the Secretary to provide where appropriate "for the examination, upon request, by the persons to whom such
regulations or orders are applicable, of similar information" obtained by the
FDA. The implementing regulation excludes "information which the Commissioner concludes must be considered confidential." 21 C.F.R. § 130-13(f)
(1965).
71 Letters to Senator Humphrey by FDA Commissioner Larrick
(Oct. 14,
1963) and Deputy Commissioner Harvey (Dec. 17, 1963) describe the FDA's
position with respect to confidentiality and to disclosure of otherwise confidential data to protect against significant hazards. Hearing on Interagency
Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation Before the Subcommittee on
Reorganization and International Organization, Senate Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, pp. 1899, 1901 (1963).
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closure of NDAs to the public,"2 there is fear that this would
sharply diminish, if not destroy, the incentive to invest in research for new drugs. This might extend even to patentable
products since the secrecy of the NDA may sometimes be more of
an impediment to competition than the patent itself. The industry
and the agency might find the task of distinguishing between
genuine trade secrets and unprotected material in editing NDAs
both difficult and time-consuming. 3 If makers of "me-too" drugs
were free to ride on the coat-tails of the first company to get approval, the wasteful proliferation of brands would be accelerated.
With these fears goes confidence that, if health needs are sufficiently serious and acute, physicians can get the information they
need from the companies or the FDA. Moreover, duplication of
investigational work is not seen as unmixed evil; it provides crosschecks on findings, and these the FDA staff, if not the profession,
can take full advantage of in making its own evaluations-or can
do so when it has been suitably computerized.
Critics of the FDA's present policy of secrecy " seem to have
had little impact on the medical profession's satisfied acquiescence
in it and, given the industry's stout support, there may be little
prospect of change. Yet are the legal and practical imperatives so
strong? Obviously any change would call for careful study, and
I am in no position to prescribe specific remedies. However, I
would urge a search in the public interest for workable intermediate
positions between full, prompt disclosure on the one hand and
secrecy on the other.
To take a different tack, the FDA might be required to accompany each drug approval with a statement of considerations
outlining the studies and findings that had led both to the drug's
72 For one of the best presentations of this position, see a letter of Aug.

8, 1963 to Senator Humphrey by Dr. R. K. Cannan, Chairman, Division of
Medical Sciences, National Academy of Sciences. Id. at 1895. For a somewhat similar position, see letter of Sept. 10, 1963 to Senator Humphrey by
Dr. J. A. Shannon, Director, National Institute of Health. Id. at 1897.
z The category of "trade secret' is not clear-cut. Perhaps the most important information it protects relates to manufacturing processes. In addition concealing physicians' and patients' identities reported in case histories
me. However, rules of practice might provide guides to aid
might be troub
the applicant in furnishing an edited version of his NDA.
z4 Several criticisms of the secrecy policy are collected in Hearings on
Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation, supra note 71,
pt. 4., pp. 1892-95, 1901, 1903, pt. 5, pp. 2527-30. See Mn=, ThE Tnm&PErlc NIGRTmUiE 143-6 (1965).
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approval and to any warnings that had been called for."' The
staff would find this burdensome, to be sure, but the FDA could
require an applicant to share the burden by submitting a draft
statement of considerations with its application. The FDA could
provide models, with compact versions for minor variations on
established drugs or their uses. Not only would this practice reveal
the factual bases of approvals, but out of such documents would
almost certainly grow standards to guide internal review and
future action, both inside and outside the agency."
The use of expert advisers. The FDA and the AEC are
coming closer into line in their resort to expert advisers. The
former's use of ad hoc committees is increasing as the latter's use of
its standing committee, the ACRS, has grown more selective. All
these advisers deliberate privately, but the ACRS is required to
make its conclusions public. If FDA used statements of considerations of the kind I have just suggested, no doubt the views of ad
hoc committees could be appended to them.
However, recourse to ad hoc advisory committees by regulatory
agencies in general and by the FDA in particular has recently
been challenged. Dean William C. Warren of the Columbia University Law School sees the administrator who is advised "by a
panel of distinguished experts" as, "likely to adopt the recommendation as his decision, without the soul-searching critical analysis to
which he would subject the same recommendation from his own
official staff .... .77 Not only is the administrator shielded from
congressional criticism if he relies on such a panel's advice, but,
Dean Warren points out, criticism would be doubled if he dis71 Statements of considerations would differ from disclosures as to side
effects and contra-indications in prescription drug brochures in that presumably the statements would disclose the factors for and against approval of
the drugs they covered and the reasons which had led to their approval
and had occasioned any conditions on approval.
76 The need to give reasons for decisions is a great stimulus to the formulation of premises from which future decisions can be derived. It is easy to
underestimate the value of such statements outside the agency by observing
that persons desirous of having them do not seem to exist. This overlooks
the potentiality of such statements (or of edited NDAs) to create both
users and media to disseminate the knowledge thus made available. A like
objection was made concerning the disclosure philosophy of the Securities
Act. See 1 Loss, SEcurrIEs REULAnON 124 (2d ed. 1961). But prospectuses have grown somewhat simpler, id. at 265, and an expert readership has
developed.
77"Even," Dean Warren adds, "if that staff consisted of the very same
experts." Warren, Congressional Investigations: Some Observations, 21 FooD
DRUG Cosm. L. J.40, 45 (1966).
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regarded the panel's advice and events later proved him wrong.
Tempted to take the safer course, he "abdicates his official func78
tion."
If the voluntary resort to advisory committees by the FDA has
aroused Dean Warren's concern-he distinguishes the use of individual consultants 7 9-presumably he would view with still greater
apprehension the suggested amendment that would make the appointment of an ad hoe advisory committee mandatory whenever
an applicant requested it.8" Naturally, such a request would be
made only when the FDA staff's position seemed adverse to the
applicant. Refusal to heed the advisory committee's counsel would
put the FDA Commissioner and staff in the uncomfortable posture
of asserting superiority in judgment to disinterested experts without
at the same time being able to make full disclosure of the factual
bases of the conflicting positions, if at least there were no requirement that statements of consideration be issued and the advisory
panels views be fully disclosed.
I submit that, to handle the hard case where neither the FDA
nor the applicant is ready to back down, a public hearing is preferable to a mandatory ad hoc advisory committee. However, in
providing for such a hearing, the FDA could well take a leaf out
of the AEC's book. Let a hearing examiner or other lawyer be
the presiding officer of a hearing board to which two or four
experts would be appointed, chosen from a panel for the relevance
of their expertise. An initial decision by such a board would not,
of course, be binding on the Commissioner, but the record before
it would provide a public basis for appraising the wisdom of his
decision or the lack thereof.
78 Ibid.

79
As to these, Dean Warren observes, "The use of consultants would not
seem to have the same pitfalls, although their use does not provide the same
'window dressing'." Id at. 46. Dean Warren urges that funds be adequate
to enable each agency to "employ full-time experts required to accomplish
the agency's mission." But in fields such as new drugs and nuclear reactors,
no agency, however ample its budget, can employ all the specialized expertise
that its
decision-making will require.
80
References to supporters of such an amendment are to be found in my

first lecture. See Cavers, Administering that Ounce of Prevention: New Drugs
and Nuclear Reactors, 68 W. VA. L. REv. 124 n.44. Opponents' views appear
in id. at n.43.
81 To select experts for service on the hearing board would not be easy;
conflicts of interest would create problems. However, the AEC seems to have
surmounted this barrier in recruiting panel members for its Atomic Safety and
Licensing Boards.
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Is Intervention Possible? To turn again to AEC experience, is
there a place for intervenors in such a hearing? Obviously the
criterion of "persons affected" could scarcely be used to determine
standing. One would not expect, say, the child-bearing wives of
America to organize and seek representation in hearings involving
drugs suspected of adverse effects on pregnant women.82 But professional and scientific societies, research institutes and the like
concerned with fields specifically related to the matters at issue
might be recognized as entitled to be heard, though perhaps denied
standing to appeal. 3
Might Uncontested Hearings Be Held? Finally, is there any
place in the FDA's approval procedure for an analogue to the
Atomic Energy Act's mandatory hearing in uncontested cases?
Might the FDA be authorized to refuse to pass upon an application until a hearing had been held and to call for a hearing even
though the applicant did not wish it? Needless to say, apt cases
for exercising this authority would be few. These might arise most
often in difficult withdrawal cases where the manufacturer preferred to remove a questioned drug quietly from the market rather
than to seek its vindication in a public hearing. Perhaps the
authority would be most valuable when the FDA was considering,
either for approval or withdrawal, a group of related drugs whose
safety or effectiveness would stand or fall on the basis of the same
findings.84 Its recent action against throat lozenges containing
antibiotics may provide such a case;" possibly the oral contraceptives will someday give rise to another. Such a hearing would
be hard to conduct;8 6 its conduct and the representation of the
But when I read this sentence to my wife, she asked, "Why not?"
Cf. the provision for "limited appearances" in AEC reactor licensing
hearings, note 40, supra.
84 The FDA has not yet had to deal with the procedural complexities
that seem destined to arise when it wishes to challenge at one time a substantial number of related drugs which, though distinct products, are open
to the same objection on the score of efficacy or safety.
8 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1966, p. 1; 29 Fed. Reg. 7728 (June 1964).
86 The difficulty has led to some speculation that the resort to regulations
might be necessary. The new drug provisions, unlike those authorizing withdrawal of certification to antibiotic drugs, Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act
§ 507(a),(f), 21 U.S.C. § 357(a),(f), do not authorize the issuance of regulations to ban drugs that are found unsafe or ineffective, but query whether
use might be made of the FDA's general rule-making authority, id. § 701(a),
21 U.S.C. § 371(a), to promulgate a finding applicable to all previously approved drugs having a specified composition or use, withdrawing approval
therefrom, subject to the right of the manufacturer of any drug within the
category to contest the Secretary's finding as to it.
82
83
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parties would make heavy demands on lawyers' skills. Badly run,
it could wind up in a shambles. Is the risk worth taking? Indeed, are any of these burdensome procedures that I have been
canvassing really worth while?
AN UNCOMFORTABLE CONCLUSION

Here at the end of our long quest for a satisfactory procedure
for administering the ounce of prevention, this question brings us
back face to face with the dilemma I noted at the close of the previous lecture. Let me restate it here, not merely for the FDA and
the AEC but for any agency charged with comparable responsibilities. On the one hand, we have to allow the government experts and their expert advisers enough freedom from legal formalities and restraints in reaching their judgments that good men can
be attracted to this task. Experts in official posts will usually yield
to contrary judgments of the best men in their guild, but their
morale will ebb if their own processes and judgments are often
overridden by what seem to them unscientific processes and nonscientific considerations. On the other hand, sooner or later the
public will reject expert judgments on which hang the safety of
many people unless at least some of these judgments can be and
are validated by public processes, however unscientific. One way
to provide public validation is resort on occasion to a public hearing before a tribunal manned by knowledgeable people of demonstrated independence whose conclusions can be rejected by
the final decision-makers in the agency only on the basis of reasoned opinions, themselves subject to public appraisal.
If this or some comparable check is not available, if the staff's
work is done and reviewed in secret, the agency, its staff and its
processes will all risk becoming the object of suspicion, perhaps not
from the public at large but from a relatively small but concerned
and articulate group of independent experts and laymen. If there
is no effective way for these critics to take part in the process of
decision or to evaluate the judgments it yields, they will exploit
whatever agency errors hindsight has laid bare and turn to political
processes. The most available of these are appeals to congressional
committees and to the citizenry at large, ranging from indignant
letters to the editor to the hair-raising best-seller. Secrecy is not
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likely long to survive these assaults, nor will public and professional confidence in the agency."
This is not a comfortable conclusion, but I do not quarrel with
it. When government undertakes to administer the ounce of prevention, it is asserting that the problems which the hazard creates
are affected with a public interest, a vital public interest. Accordingly, its administration must be such as to achieve and maintain public confidence.
Addendum: Since I delivered the Donley Lectures six months
ago, the FDA has experienced a dramatic change. A new Commissioner, a physician, Dr. James L. Goddard, has launched
vigorous enforcement programs aimed at prescription drugs. He has
sharply criticized the pharmaceutical drug industry and some drug
investigators. The FDA has seized approved drugs for exaggerated advertising claims of efficacy, has terminated the investigational drug exemption for the widely-publicized DMSO and has
initiated the withdrawal of a new drug's approval because the
investigator's report supporting it contained untrue statements. Dr.
Goddard has been warmly applauded in the press. Dr. Sadusk,
after resigning as head of FDA's Bureau of Medicine, has raised
a dissenting voice, warning that the FDA may be assuming too
many of the medical profession's responsibilities. If the present
activist policies continue, probably the FDA's administrative actions will be challenged more often in the future than heretofore.
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A possible response by the agency might be to "avoid future trouble
by always refusing clearance" or to use "the official escape of saying that
there is inadequate data." Austem, Drug Regulation and the Public Health,
19 FooD, DRUG Cosm. L.J. 259, 270 (1964). This too would destroy confidence, although, for a time, in a different quarter.
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